We propose two practical and provably secure password hashing algorithms, Pleco and Plectron. They are built upon well-understood cryptographic algorithms, and combine advantages of symmetric and asymmetric primitives. By employing the Rabin cryptosystem, we prove that the onewayness of Pleco is at least as strong as the hard problem of integer factorization. In addition, both password hashing algorithms are designed to be sequential memory-hard, in order to thwart large-scale password cracking by parallel hardware, such as GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs. Moreover, the total computation and memory consumptions of Pleco and Plectron are tunable through their cost parameters.
INTRODUCTION
Password-based authentication may be the most widely deployed security mechanism across all information systems. However, there are two fundamental limitations of passwordbased authentication: 1) Users usually pick poor passwords that are subject to dictionary attacks or brute-force search; and 2) A device or server storing many passwords is a juicy target for attackers, and how to store passwords securely and minimize damages if the device or server has been breached is non-trivial. As an effective countermeasure, passwords should be obscured together with user-specific and highentropy salts by applying a one-way function, namely password hashing. During authentication, the user's input is processed in the same way and then the result is compared with the one stored in the device or server.
There are several requirements that a good password hashing algorithm should fulfill:
• Similar as most cryptographic primitives, the password hashing algorithm should behave as a random function that ensures one-wayness and collision resistance.
• Different from most cryptographic primitives, the password hashing algorithm should be heavyweight in computation and memory usage to slow down brute-force Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage, and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s attacks to a certain degree and make large-scale attacks economically difficult.
In this paper, we propose two novel password hashing algorithms, named Pleco and Plectron, respectively, based upon several well-studied cryptographic structures and primitives. The novelty in the designs of Pleco and Plectron is the combination of asymmetric and symmetric components that offers a twofold benefit: 1) Since the tools to cryptanalyzing asymmetric algorithms are quite different from those for symmetric ones, the composition of asymmetric and symmetric components will make cryptanalysis much harder. This is analogous to the designs of ARX based cryptographic primitives [1, 3] and the block cipher IDEA [5] where mixed operations are used; 2) The asymmetric component makes our scheme provably secure (the security of Pleco is as strong as the hard problem of integer factorization). In addition to describing the Pleco and Plectron designs in great detail, we also theoretically prove their security with respect to one-wayness and collision resistance.
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS

Design Components
Provably One-Way Function
It is proven that the security of the Rabin public-key encryption scheme is computationally equivalent to the hard problem of integer factorization [7] . Let us define
where x is a positive integer in the multiplicative group of integers modulo n. Then computing the square roots, i.e., inverting the function Rabinn(x), is proven to be computationally equivalent to factorizing the integer n.
Sponge-Based Hash Function
Keccak, which is designed by Bertoni et al. [4] , is the winner of the SHA-3 cryptographic hash function competition held by NIST. Keccak is based on a unique construction, namely sponge construction, which can absorb an arbitrarylength binary string as input, and then squeeze out a binary string of any required length as output. If not specified, default parameters of Keccak should be used, i.e., r = 1024 and c = 576.
Sequential Memory-Hard Construction
The password-based key derivation function scrypt was proposed by Percival in order to thwart parallel brute-force attacks using GPUs, FPGAs or ASICs on passwords [6] , and has been widely used by cryptocurrencies. One of the core components of scrypt, namely ROMix, is proven to be sequential memory-hard. One important feature of being sequential memory-hard is that parallel algorithms cannot asymptotically achieve efficiency advantage than non-parallel ones. In other words, brute-force password search by using dedicated hardware with constrained memory, such as GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs, would not be significantly faster than a singlecore desktop computer. For a more detailed definition of sequential memory-hard, the reader is referred to [6] .
Designs of Pleco and Plectron
The following notations are used in this section:
• || concatenates two binary strings;
• int(·) converts a binary string into a non-negative integer, where the little-endian convention is used, i.e., the left-most (lowest address) bit is the least significant bit of the integer;
• str b (·) converts a non-negative integer back to a binary string by using the same bit ordering convention as int(·), and may append zeros to the string in order to achieve a total length of b bits;
• 0 t denotes a t-bit all-zero binary string, e.g., 0 t = strt(0) for t > 0, and 0 0 means an empty string;
• len(·) denotes the bit-length of a binary string;
• size(·) denotes the number of bits in the binary representation of a given non-negative integer, e.g., size(256) = 9 and size(255) = 8;
• Keccak b denotes a Keccak instance that produces exactly b bits as output.
Given a modulus n, we define a new hash function
where N = size(n). To be secure, N should be at least 1024, or preferably larger than 3072, according to [2] . The modulus n can be obtained using the same approach for generating the RSA modulus n = p·q or chosen from a public composite number with unknown factorization as proposed in the design of SQUASH [8] .
Our new password hashing algorithm Pleco is defined by Algorithm 1, which takes as input
• a modulus n,
• a 128-bit binary string salt as a unique or randomly generated salt,
• a variable-length (≤ 128 bytes) binary string pass as a user password,
• a positive integer tcost as the time cost parameter,
• and a positive integer mcost as the memory cost parameter.
Pleco will produce an N -bit hash tag, but sometimes applications need to flexibly choose tag sizes, e.g., generating cryptographic keys from passphrases entered by users. We recommend applying Keccak to the output of Pleco
1024−len(pass) 3: ctr ← 0 4: x ← Hn(str128(ctr)||x) 5: for i ← 0 to tcost − 1 do 6: for j ← 0 to mcost − 1 do 7:
vj ← x 8:
ctr ← ctr + 1 9:
x ← Hn(str128(ctr)||x) 10:
end for 11:
for j ← 0 to mcost − 1 do 12:
k ← int(x) mod mcost 13:
ctr ← ctr + 1 14:
x ← Hn(str128(ctr)||x||0 L ||v k ) 15:
end for 16:
ctr ← ctr + 1 17:
x ← Hn(str128(ctr)||x) 18: end for 19: return x again to produce tags of required lengths. We name this modified algorithm as Plectron and specifies its design in Algorithm 2, where
• hsize denotes the desired bit-length of the hash tag.
Algorithm 2 Plectron(n, salt, pass, tcost, mcost, hsize) 1: t ← Pleco(n, salt, pass, tcost, mcost) 2: return Keccak hsize (t)
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In what follows, we discuss security properties of Pleco and Plectron in detail. Due to the page limitation, we omit the proofs for our theorems. For more details, please refer to our full paper [9] .
One-Wayness
One of the most important security goals of designing a password hashing scheme is one-wayness, i.e., attackers should not be able to devise any methods faster than bruteforce search for inverting the hashing algorithm in order to obtain original passwords.
Formally, we give the following definition.
Definition 1. For a given function f and a pre-specified set Y containing certain outputs of f , we define the advantage of an adversary A finding preimages of the elements in Y (i.e., inverting f ) as
where y $ ← Y means randomly assigning one element of Y to y.
Then we can give the theorems about the one-wayness of Pleco and Plectron. The preimage security of Pleco is guaranteed by Rabinn.
Theorem 1 (One-Wayness of Pleco). If Pleco and
Hn use a same modulus n, then we have
where S is a set containing all possible outputs of Pleco.
Theorem 2 (One-Wayness of Plectron). If Hn and
Plectron use a same modulus n, then we have
where S is a set containing all possible outputs of Plectron.
Collision Resistance
Formally, we give the following security definitions.
Definition 2. For a given function f , we define the advantage of an adversary A to find a collision of f as
Definition 3. For a given function f , we define the advantage of an adversary A to obtain an output difference d as
Definition 4. For a given positive composite integer m, we define the advantage of an adversary A to obtain a nontrivial factor of m as
We give the following theorems to characterize adversaries' collision advantages on Pleco and Plectron.
Theorem 3 (Collision Resistance of Pleco). If the cost parameters, mcost and tcost, of Pleco keep unchanged, and Hn and Pleco use a same modulus n, then we have
Theorem 4 (Collision Resistance of Plectron).
If the cost parameters and output hash length, mcost, tcost and hsize, of Plectron keep unchanged, and Hn and Plectron use a same modulus n, then we have
Thwarting Parallel Brute-Force Attacks
The hardware such as GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs can feature thousands of cores for parallel computation, but in return each core possesses very restrained memory space. By using the structure of ROMix, the internal iteration of Pleco (Lines 6-15 in Algorithm 1) inherits scrypt's security property of being sequential memory-hard. Pleco and Plectron also provide a tunable memory parameter mcost to increase their memory cost as desired. Although the design of Pleco is slightly different from ROMix, the security proofs of ROMix can be easily transferred to here, since in the original proofs the internal hash function is treated as a Random Oracle.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We have tested our initial implementations of Pleco and Plectron on a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 processor. We set tcost = 1 and mcost = 2 16 when profiling the software performance, which means the programs will consume 2 16 size(n)-bit memory, i.e., around 17 MB for Pleco/Plectron using 2048-bit moduli. We have also tested scrypt on the same machine, using the configuration (N = 2 14 , r = 8, p = 1) that yields a similar memory usage as Pleco/Plectron with 2048-bit moduli, and it takes 35 ms to compute scrypt. 
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